Verifiable blind quantum computing is a secure delegated quantum computing where a client with a limited quantum technology delegates her quantum computing to a server who has a universal quantum computer. The client's privacy is protected (blindness) and the correctness of the computation is verifiable by the client in spite of her limited quantum technology (verifiability). There are mainly two types of protocols for verifiable blind quantum computing: the protocol where the client has only to generate single-qubit states, and the protocol where the client needs only the ability of single-qubit measurements. The latter is called the measurement-only verifiable blind quantum computing. If the input of the client's quantum computing is a quantum state whose classical efficient description is not known to the client, there was no way for the measurement-only client to verify the correctness of the input. Here we introduce a new protocol of measurement-only verifiable blind quantum computing where the correctness of the quantum input is also verifiable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Blind quantum computing is a secure delegated quantum computing where a client (Alice) who does not have enough quantum technology delegates her quantum computing to a server (Bob) who has a universal quantum computer without leaking any information about her quantum computing. By using measurement-based quantum computing [1, 2] , Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi first showed that blind quantum computing is indeed possible for a client who can do only the single qubit state generation [3] . Since the breakthrough, many theoretical improvements have been obtained [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , and even a proof-of-principle experiment was achieved with photonic qubits [13] . These blind quantum computing protocols guarantee two properties: first, if Bob is honest, Alice can obtain the correct result of her quantum computing (correctness). Second, whatever Bob does, he cannot gain any information about Alice's quantum computing (blindness) [14] .
In stead of the single-qubit state generation, the ability of single-qubit measurements is also enough for Alice: it was shown in Ref. [15] that Alice who can do only singlequbit measurements can perform blind quantum computing. The idea is that Bob generates a graph state and sends each qubit one by one to Alice. If Bob is honest, he generates the correct graph state and therefore Alice can perform the correct measurement-based quantum computing (correctness). If Bob is malicious, he might send a wrong state to Alice, but whatever Bob sends to Alice, Alice's measurement angles, which contain information about Alice's computation, cannot be transmitted to Bob due to the no-signaling principle (blindness). The protocol is called the measurement-only protocol, since Alice needs only measurements.
A problem in all these protocols is the lack of the ver- * Electronic address: morimae@gunma-u.ac.jp ifiability: although the blindness guarantees that Bob cannot learn Alice's quantum computing, he can still deviate from the correct procedure, mess up her quantum computing, and give Alice a completely wrong result. Since Alice cannot perform quantum computing by herself, she cannot check the correctness of the result by herself unless the problem is, say, in NP, and therefore she can accept a wrong result. To solve the problem, verifiable blind quantum computing protocol was introduced in Ref. [16] , and some theoretical improvements were also obtained [17] [18] [19] . Experimental demonstrations of the verification were also done [20, 21] . The basic idea of these protocols is so called the trap technique: Alice hides some trap qubits in the register, and any change of a trap signals Bob's malicious behavior. By checking traps, Alice can detect any Bob's malicious behavior with high probability. If the computation is encoded by a quantum error detection code, the probability that Alice is fooled by Bob can be exponentially small, since in that case in order to change the logical state, Bob has to touch many qubits, and it consequently increases the probability that Bob touches some traps.
Recently, a new verification protocol that does not use the trap technique was proposed [22] (see also Ref. [23] ). In this protocol, Bob generates a graph state, and sends each qubit of it one by one to Alice. Alice directly verifies the correctness of the graph state (and therefore the correctness of the computation) sent from Bob by measuring stabilizer operators. This verification technique is called the stabilizer test. Note that the stabilizer test is useful also in quantum interactive proof system [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] .
Although computing itself is verifiable through the stabilizer test, the input is not if it is a quantum state whose classical efficient description is not known to Alice. For example, let us assume that Alice receives a state |ψ from Charlie, and she wants to apply a unitary U on |ψ . If she delegates the quantum computation to Bob in the measurement-only style, a possible procedure is as follows. Alice first sends |ψ to Bob. Bob next entangles |ψ to the graph state. Bob then sends each qubit of the state one by one to Alice, and Alice does measurement-based quantum computing on it. If Bob is honest, Alice can realize U |ψ . Furthermore, as is shown in Refs. [24] In this paper, we introduce a new protocol of measurement-only verifiable blind quantum computing where not only the computation itself but also the quantum input are verifiable. Our strategy is to combine the trap technique and the stabilizer test. The correctness of the computing is verified by the stabilizer test, and the correctness of the quantum input is verified by checking the trap qubits that are randomly hidden in the input state. When the traps are checked, the state can be isolated from the graph state by measuring the connecting qubits in Z basis. The main technical challenge in our proof is to show that the trap verification and the stabilizer verification can coexist with each other.
II. STABILIZER TEST
We first review the stabilizer test. Let us consider an N -qubit state ρ and a set g ≡ {g 1 , ..., g n } of generators of a stabilizer group. The stabilizer test is a following test:
n .
Measure the operator
Note that this measurement can be done with single-qubit measurements, since s k is a tensor product of Pauli operators.
If the result is +1 (−1), the test passes (fails).
The probability of passing the stabilizer test is
We can show that if the probability of passing the test is high, p pass ≥ 1−ǫ, then ρ is "close" to a certain stabilized state σ in the sense of
for any POVM element M .
In
From the gentle measurement lemma [29] ,
Note that
for any j, and therefore, ΛρΛ/Tr(Λρ) is a stabilized state.
For any positive operator M ,
which means
And, for any positive operator M ,
III. OUR PROTOCOL
Now we explain our protocol and analyze it, which is the main result of the present paper. Let us consider the following situation: Alice possesses an m-qubit state |ψ , but she neither knows its classical description nor a classical description of a quantum circuit that efficiently generates the state. (For example, she just receives |ψ from her friend Charlie, etc.) She wants to perform a polynomial-size quantum computing U on the input |ψ , but she cannot do it by herself. She therefore asks Bob, who is very powerful but not trusted, to perform her quantum computing. We show that Alice can delegate her quantum computing to Bob without revealing |ψ and U , and she can verify the correctness of the computation and input.
For simplicity, we assume that Alice wants to solve a decision problem L. Alice measures the output qubit of U |ψ in the computational basis, and accepts (rejects) if the result is 1 (0). As usual, we assume that for any yes instance x, i.e., x ∈ L, the acceptance probability is larger than a, and for any no instance x, i.e., x / ∈ L, the acceptance probability is smaller than b, where a − b ≥ 1/poly(|x|).
Our protocol runs as follows:
1. Alice randomly chooses a 3m-qubit permutation P , and applies it on |Ψ ≡ |ψ ⊗ |0 ⊗m ⊗ |+ ⊗m to generate P |Ψ . Alice further chooses a random 6m-bit string (x 1 , ..., x 3m , z 1 , ..., z 3m ) ∈ {0, 1} 6m , and applies
She sends |Ψ ′ to Bob. (Or, it is reasonable to assume that Charlie gives Alice |Ψ ′ and information of P and (x 1 , ..., x 3m , z 1 , ..., z 3m ) in stead of giving |ψ .) 2. If Bob is honest, he generates the (3m + N )-qubit state
and sends each qubit of it one by one to Alice, where CZ e is the CZ gate on the vertices of the edge e, and E connect is the set of edges that connects qubits in |G and |Ψ ′ (Fig. 1) . If Bob is malicious, he sends any (3m + N )-qubit state ρ to Alice.
3. 3-a. With probability q, which is specified later, Alice does the measurement-based quantum computing on qubits sent from Bob. If the computation result is accept (reject), she accepts (rejects). (During the computation, Alice of course corrects the initial random Pauli operator and permutation ( 3m j=1 X xj j Z zj j )P .) 3-b. With probability (1 − q)/2, Alice does the stabilizer test, and if she passes (fails) the test, she accepts (rejects).
3-c. With probability (1 − q)/2, Alice does the following test, which we call the input-state test: Let V 1 and V 2 be the set of qubits in the red dotted box and the blue dotted box in Fig. 1 , respectively. Alice stores qubits in V 2 in her memory, and measures each qubit in V 1 in Z basis. If the Z-basis measurement result on the nearest-neighbour of jth vertex in V 2 is 1, Alice applies Z on the jth vertex in V 2 for j = 1, ..., 3m. If Bob was honest, the state of V 2 is now
Alice further applies P † ( Now let us analyze the protocol. First, the blindness is obvious, since what she sends to Bob is the completelymixed state from Bob's view point, and due to the nosignaling principle, Alice's operations on states sent from Bob do not transmit any information to Bob.
Second, let us consider the case of x ∈ L. In this case, honest Bob generates the correct state, |G Ψ ′ , Eq. (2), and therefore Alice can do correct computation, if she chooses the measurement-based quantum computing, passes the stabilizer test with probability 1, if she chooses the stabilizer test, and passes the input-state test with probability 1, if she chooses the input-state test. Therefore, the acceptance probability, p x∈L acc , is
Finally, let us consider the case of x / ∈ L. In this case, Bob might be malicious, and can send any (3m + N )-qubit state ρ. Let p Gpass and p ψpass be the probability of passing the stabilizer test and the initial-state test, respectively.
Let ǫ = 1 poly(|x|) . It is easy to see that the acceptance probability, p x / ∈L acc , is given as follows:
3. If p Gpass < 1 − ǫ and p ψpass < 1 − ǫ, then
Let us consider the remaining case, p Gpass ≥ 1 − ǫ and p ψpass ≥ 1 − ǫ. From the triangle inequality and the invariance of the trace norm under a unitary operation, we obtain
where
and σ is any 3m-qubit state on V 2 . Since p Gpass ≥ 1 − ǫ, the first term is upperbounded as
from Eq. (1). We can show that if p ψpass ≥ 1 − ǫ, the second term is upperbounded as
The proof is given in Appendix. Therefore, we obtain
for the POVM element Π corresponding to the acceptance of the measurement-based quantum computing. Therefore, the total acceptance probability, p
Let us define
of q is that satisfies ∆ 1 (q) = ∆ 3 (q). Then, if we take a = 1 − 2 −r and b = 2 −r for a polynomial r,
.
As usual, the inverse polynomial gap can be amplified with a polynomial overhead.
In this appendix, we show Eq. (3). Due to the triangle inequality and the invariance of the trace norm under a unitary operation,
where ρ bef ore is the state before measuring {Λ 0 , Λ 1 }. From the monotonicity of the trace distance under a CPTP map, the first term is upperbounded as As is shown below, the second term is upperbounded as 
where σ α is a 3m-qubit Pauli operator, and E k is a Kraus operator. Let us decompose each Kraus operator in terms of Pauli operators as E k = β C k β σ β . Since
we obtain
Then,
Here, σ 0 = I ⊗3m , we have used the relation α σ α σ β σ α ρσ α σ γ σ α = 0 for any ρ and β = γ, and defined
It is obvious that Tr I ⊗m − ψ ⊗ 0 ⊗m ⊗ + ⊗m × ρ 1 = 0.
